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The Victory of Good

DANIEL D. WILLIAMS

Our hopes have been profoundly disturbed. We believed that the inner spirit and the outward forms of life might be cleansed and rebuilt according to the pattern of the Kingdom of Good Will. Both secular philosophy and liberal Christianity supported this hope. Now we must ask whether and in what sense it was an illusion. Christianity has always offered hope. Our problem is to find the nature and ground of that hope which will not leave men forsaken. What kind of belief in the victory of good, of God's good, is possible?

For many Christians today a clear-cut answer is not in sight. This paper attempts simply to explore three basic considerations which must be faced by any Christian philosophy which points to the triumph of the good in the world.

The inquiry is philosophical, presupposing that empirical and rational examination of the status of values in human life reveals data for Christian thought. Since the relevance of philosophical inquiry for Christian theology is denied by some neo-orthodox positions, a word about the relation of the present paper to the neo-orthodox movement may be pertinent. Many of us have been baffled in attempting to understand what the new theology means when it uses the terms sin, total depravity, and the transcendence of the Kingdom of God, because the ultimate meaning of these terms, according to their expositors, is revealed only to faith.¹ Yet liberals have been driven both by these theologies, and by the world's tragedy, to look again at life to see whether liberalism has overlooked some realities which orthodoxy is facing. The belief is defended in this paper that certain facts which are accessible not only to the faith of the Christian, but to anyone who will examine with reasonable accuracy and clarity the status of value in human life, give concrete content to the traditional doctrines of the Fall, total depravity, and the transcendence of the Kingdom of God. Our interpretations of these doctrines may not mean exactly the

¹Cf. Emil Brunner, *The Mediator* (New York: Macmillan, 1934), pp. 149-150.

same thing as the orthodox mean by them; but we may find some common ground in concrete human experience for a measure of mutual understanding.

I.

Christianity hopes for the triumph of the good. The first problem to be explored is involved in the nature of goodness itself. How freely we use the word and how difficult the justification for its use becomes when we are pressed. Put the problem of the good in the form of this question: Is it possible that the word covers up a fundamental and ineradicable contradiction? Is it possible that nothing is simply good and that all existing things are involved in complex relationships of value and disvalue? (The terms good and value are here used synonymously.) To attempt to answer this question is to find a dark curtain lifted and some of life's most perplexing and tragic areas revealed.

The tragic choice, not between good and evil, but between good and good is the rule of life, not the exception. Individualism and collectivism pull us in opposite directions, demands of family and of a larger cause haunt us with a sense of conflicting duties, the ideal and the practical are shattered upon one another. Every major decision Christians face today places them in a tragic dilemma from which pure escape is impossible. Food for the democracies? What shall we say if that food makes the defense of democracy more difficult? To fight or not to fight? What can we do that does not involve us in intolerable evil? Consider the problem which Marshal Pétain faces. Every decision must be a compromise, with every choice something to be gained for France, and something to be lost. Pétain's dilemma symbolizes the moral problem of every responsible being. Alien orders invade the patterns of our lives, and force us to compromise or die, yet every compromise involves the sacrifice of some good, and every positive good achieved may be also a positive evil.

Kierkegaard and Nietzsche in modern philosophy went most deeply into the tragic paradoxes of human life, and each in his own way sought salvation "Beyond Good and Evil." At the present time the works of Nicolai Hartmann, Nicolas Berdyaev, Paul Tillich, and Reinhold Niebuhr include the major discussion of this problem. The position they share may be stated in three propositions about value, or the good, which we shall examine.

The first proposition is that many special values either in their ideal essence, or as they enter into existence, are in conflict with and prevent the realization of other values with equal claim upon human life. This is Hartmann's principle of the antinomy in the realm of value. Interpreting values as ideal essences Hartmann finds that some pairs of values in their very nature exclude one another. His clearest example is the antinomic relation between purity and richness of experience. Each is a value in its own right, yet each excludes the other.² A parallel example from classic Christian experience would be the antinomy between the active and the contemplative life.

Hartmann's antinomies are especially sharp because of his presupposition that values are ideal essences. Theories which interpret value wholly in terms of concrete possibilities would hold that some kind of synthesis of opposite tendencies is possible in the empirical human life. Yet Hartmann's analysis by its very abstractness reveals a fundamental conflict in ethical living. Who will say that he has discovered the synthesis of purity and many-sidedness, or of the active and the contemplative life?

Hartmann himself gives much attention to analysis of antinomies between values which have entered into existence. He holds that the problem is even more acute here, for values like love and justice, which are not mutually exclusive in their ideal essence, are frequently exclusive when any concrete carrier of value in the world seeks to realize one or the other.³ The familiar themes of tragic literature, the conflict between the individual and the group, the conflict of one loyalty with another, lay bare the inner dilemma of every moral agent.

Berdyayev sees the moral problem from the perspective of the three types of ethical orders in which human living is involved.⁴ These orders of the law, of redemption, and of creativeness are distinct and in conflict, yet they all have a claim upon life. The order of law is the pattern of custom, social orderliness, coercive restriction, and moral code. The order of redemption exemplifies the ethic of the Gospel with its forgiving, uncalculating love. The publicans and sinners enter the Kingdom first. The order of crea-

²Nicolai Hartmann, *Ethics*, Eng. trans. Stanton Coit (London and New York: Macmillan, 1932), II, 211-212.

³*Ibid.*, p. 77.

⁴Nicolas Berdyayev, *The Destiny of Man*, trans. by Duddington (New York: Scribners, 1937).

tiveness sets aside the problem of uniting the soul to God. It seeks to realize the possibilities of human life in all their uniqueness, richness, and concrete value. It is the aesthetic, moral, intellectual expression of the creative spirit of man made possible by his participation in the divine creativity.

Now each of these orders is good, and in some ways each helps the other. Without the ethic of law and custom, society is impossible. Walter Marshall Horton remarks that the suppression of head-hunting in certain tribes would not only disarrange the whole matrimonial system, but would damage the "moral consciousness and self-respect of the whole community."⁵ Without the ethic of law, the ethic of redemption may sink into a vapid sentimentality. Without the ethic of redemption, that of the law becomes cruel; and without creativity it is sterile. At the same time there is conflict between the orders. The Gospel virtue of love is incommensurable with the worldly judgment of honor. There is conflict between the ethic of redemption and that of creativity. "The greatness of creative genius is not correlative to moral perfection."⁶ Had Pushkin concentrated on saving his soul, he would never have become a creative artist.⁷ There is conflict also between the order of law and the order of personal prophetic creativity.⁸ Any minister who has taken seriously the problem of being both priest and prophet can testify to the genuineness of dilemmas which the different orders of value present.

The ambiguity of value raises this problem for religious hope: How can man hope for the victory of the good when the goods he knows are also non-goods, and when the realization of concrete values in life automatically shuts out the realization of other values with equal rights? It may be objected that such a judgment cannot be made unless we define the good, and nothing has been said about definition. But the attempt to define the good simply plunges us back into our problem again. For the question is, can one so define the good that in any given relation that which is good is not also involved in evil? Define good in terms of the satisfaction of desire, for example, and the problem remains of finding any value

⁵Walter M. Horton, *Can Christianity Save Civilization?* (New York: Harper, 1940), p. 29.

⁶Berdyayev, *Op. cit.*, p. 167.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 168.

⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 119-121.

in the ideal realm or in existence which can be said unambiguously to satisfy human desire. Not only is the question, "whose desire?" pertinent, but the ambiguous situation obtains in the individual himself. "Who has the choice, he has the torment," runs an ancient proverb. If one defines the good in terms of function within an order as in the idealist doctrines of harmony and self-realization, the problem of conflicting orders of value remains. Define the good in terms of ideal essences, and here also antinomies prevail both in the ideal essences themselves and in the situation in which these essences touch existence.

It appears that the goods of life belong to an order of value, the wholeness of which is broken by unresolved conflicts. If Hartmann is right that "in the obscure concept of the 'good' somehow a universal relativity within the whole sphere must lie concealed, and perhaps, indeed, a principle of its structure, an order and an organic law,"⁹ then the redemption of life in the sense of the restoration of its wholeness must be looked for in a new order of being, not in a perfecting of this order. Do we not have here a possible meaning of the doctrine that the world itself is involved in the Fall?

A more serious problem of the good is revealed in the fact that the goods of life, and man's striving after the good, may be the very means of intensifying the evil and destructive tendencies of life. This is the second proposition in the theory of the ambiguity of value. The truth here is peculiarly accessible to those who know religion well, for it is religion which most clearly exhibits the problem. Will not most ministers confess that while they see the destructive tendencies of irreligion, they fear even more the destructive tendencies of religion? Nothing is quite so likely to pervert human life, block its growth, and lead to moral blindness as the eager search for and possession of the power of religion. The search for God, the desire for salvation, the comfort of religion, the passion for justice, the loyalty to the religious institution, from these have sprung the greatest evils as well as the greatest goods in human life. There is no cruelty religion has not intensified, and no prejudice it has not sanctified. The very eagerness to serve mankind in the spirit of love may lead to a sentimental blindness to the needs of man, or to a cruel intolerance. "Our age," says Hermann Rauschnig, "permits itself to be car-

⁹Hartmann, *Op. cit.*, p. 68.

ried away by brutality in the guise of religious ecstasy."¹⁰ The New Testament picture of the Pharisees surely reveals the tragic blindness to the good which religion itself may create. No injustice is so evil as that which derives its sanctification from the ideal of justice. Dr. Franz Gurtner, German Minister of Justice since 1932, is quoted by *Time* magazine as having said that mass murders of Jews are "valid not only as law but as deeds of statesmanlike beauty."¹¹ Many good Christians, horrified at this statement will not see the parallel to their own conviction that the solution of the problem of the world lies in mass murder of the German people. Berdyaev observes: "There is something truly tragic in the fact that the reaction of righteousness against unrighteousness may result in fresh evil."¹²

The same perversion of the good appears in the secular values of freedom, individualism, nationalism. Professor Tillich believes that it is the creative idealistic striving within the three great secular movements of our time which drives them to their own destruction in the catastrophe in which they involve mankind.¹³ It is humanism within capitalism, the purpose of reintegration in nationalism, and the expectation of justice in Bolshevism which intensify the passionate blindness which drives these orders toward their tragic fate.

A possible meaning of the doctrines of the Fall and total depravity is revealed in this analysis. The latter term is a bad one both because the term "total" ignores the ambiguity of good and evil, and because depravity has a connotation of disease which does not do justice to the positive value of life. But if one means by the doctrine that man allows the very goods of life to be the means of separating him from the fulfillment of life, then justification can be found for holding that man is a lost sinner, estranged from the true center of life.

The third proposition respecting the ambiguity of the good has a long tradition in Christian apologetics. It is the contention that evil is necessary in order to bring forth, strengthen, and reveal the

¹⁰Hermann Rauschning, *The Revolution of Nihilism* (New York: Longman's, 1939), p. 36.

¹¹Quoted in *Time*, February 10, 1941, p. 68.

¹²Berdyaev, *Op. cit.*, p. 202.

¹³Paul Tillich, paper in Oxford Conference Volume, *The Kingdom of God and History* (Chicago: Willett Clark, 1938), p. 137.

good.¹⁴ Moral values such as courage, mercy, endurance, humility are possible only if there are genuine evils to be overcome. Moral character depends upon freedom to sin, that is upon the genuine possibility of evil. A world in which good was victorious in the sense that the power of evil was broken would have no moral value. In Hartmann's words, "the life of a moral being is a journey along the edge of an abyss. Every retreat from the abyss is an abandonment of moral being, an approach to a second abyss."¹⁵ Many recent Christian views of immortality tacitly recognize this truth in insisting that from any human point of view any desirable immortality would have to involve growth and struggle.

Christians see the ultimate goodness at the heart of God in the vicarious suffering, the merciful forgiveness of the Cross. Here is the light of the world. Yet this radiance of forgiving and suffering love would be impossible were there no suffering to be borne and no sin to be forgiven.

One hesitates to state this fact since it has been the basis of so much complacency in the presence of evil, and has been used to urge men to bear injustice rather than remedy it. Those who thus use this truth, however, obscure its ultimate significance. What it really leaves us with is the perception not that all is right with the world, but rather that a baffling contradiction resides in the very heart of the human situation. There can be no great good unless it is effectively opposed by some great evil. Yet the good is really good, the spirit of love on the cross is really light and not darkness. So far as the victory of good is concerned, we are left with the paradox that the achievement of good depends in part upon the reality of evil. If, then, by the Kingdom of God we mean the order in which God's will is fully realized, and the wholeness of existence fully established, we can only speak of this Kingdom as an order which is different from this present world order. Its nature is unimaginable from the human side.

II.

In spite of the difficulties of making judgments of value, unless we are to discard entirely our moral experience, we must assume that there are valid distinctions to be made between less justice

¹⁴Cf. Paul's *Letter to the Romans* 3:5-8, 5:1-11.

W. R. Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God* (New York: Macmillan, 1921), pp. 333-334.

¹⁵Hartmann, *Op. cit.*, p. 181.

and more justice, between an order of destructive conflict and an order of creative understanding and good will. If God does seek in the world a good which is not yet realized, hope for the establishment of that good involves a second question: Is there power available in the universe for the establishment of the good? Professor John Bennett, who believes that Christianity must promise the victory of Good, points out that hope for such a victory depends upon the relationship of the good to "the factors which determine destiny."¹⁶ Capacity to determine destiny is power. What power is available to direct the destiny of the universe toward the good?

The analysis of types of power involves considerable complexity. For the present discussion it is sufficient to distinguish two general types of effectiveness, that which *persuades* and that which *compels*. That which persuades is effective through its inherent reasonableness and goodness. This is the type of power by which reason and value move responsible persons; it is essentially the power of love, and may be called spiritual power. The power which *compels* moves by determining life below the level of the conscious response of reason and good will.

Some Christians hold that good will in itself is a force sufficient to overcome the world. Writing in the *Christian Century* Rufus Jones, Glen Clark, Dr. Carver, and Muriel Lester say:

If we are true followers of Christ we must accept the fact that love is the strongest force in the universe, so strong that it needs no other force to protect it or to sustain it, and that prayer, when two or three agree asking in the spirit of Jesus is indeed the supreme energy of the Christian.¹⁷

The difficulty with this standpoint is the lack of evidence to support it. Even the mystic who apprehends the reality of love as a separate and powerful force, must surely acknowledge the effective thwarting of love in the world. Martyrs of good will have always converted some, but never all. Those who uphold this view are driven logically to conclude either that there are no evils in the world because love is stronger than evil, or else that there has never been any love in the world, because all evil would by now have been destroyed by it.

¹⁶John Bennett, Communication in *Journal of Religion*, XX (April, 1940), p. 175.

¹⁷G. W. Carver, G. Clark, R. Jones, and M. Lester, "Prayer That Prevails," *The Christian Century*, LVII (May 8, 1940), p. 604.

In sharp contrast to this reliance upon the power of love alone Professor Tillich denies the effectiveness of any spiritual power as such:

Only a spirit which is the expression of a vital tendency has power for life. To be sure, "thoughts that come on dove's feet can rule the world"; to be sure, the thinker and the spiritual person, excluded from all social positions of power, can have immeasurable social effects. But he can do so only because a psychical or social trend of life finds expression in his thoughts and thereby attains form and power.¹⁸

The problem of the power of good over evil may be put in another way. If evil is to have any reality at all, that is, if it is to be effectively evil against the good, it must be able to get a foothold in existence, it must have power. Platonic theories of evil which deny its real existence always obscure the real tragedy of the situation of the good. Christian insight has always been closer to Manichaeism than to Platonism on this point. But if evil tendencies have power, they have power against whatever power the good may have or be able to bring to its support. If evil has power, then good is in conflict with it, and it is a real conflict. But if it is a real conflict, victory for the good must always be partial, so far as this world is concerned, and indeed it may not be guaranteed in any sense. This is the conclusion to which Professor Wiedeman and Professor Tillich both come. In Chesterton's phrase, "There is no such thing as fighting on the winning side. We fight to find out which is the winning side."

A clear realization of the way in which the good must depend upon a power which does not merely persuade but which compels is seen in Dr. A. W. Palmer's comment on the possible solution of the international problem. He said in reply to Dr. Dwight Bradley's questions regarding international problems:

What the world needs is not another Versailles, but an honest-to-goodness world conference with everybody in on the ground floor.¹⁹

Now what does being in on the ground floor mean? Surely it means more than an equal right to be heard and to deliberate in parliamentary fashion. It must mean a bargaining power equal to the task of asserting the justice of the cause of each nation against the others. And why is this necessary? Because without equal

¹⁸Paul Tillich, *The Interpretation of History* (New York: Scribner's, 1936), p. 191.

¹⁹Dwight Bradley and Albert W. Palmer, "America and the War," *Christian Century*, LVII (August 21, 1940), 1025-1027.

bargaining power a weaker nation must succumb to the superior power of another.

If we conclude that good will and justice must in some way be rooted in the drives and powers of the world in order to be fully effective, we then have a new problem to face. What happens to the spirit of justice and of good will when it becomes involved in the compulsive drives of individual and social life? The spirit cannot maintain itself by itself, but it surrenders its purity to the world the moment it accepts the world's support. Here we face the tragic moral dilemma which more than any other torments the Christian conscience.

In what way is the spirit corrupted by becoming incarnate? First of all, the spirit embodied in individual or social order belongs to that which lives by destroying other life. A simple place to see this truth revealed is in the fact that human life maintains itself by exploiting and destroying animal life. Undoubtedly good reasons can be found to justify this fact; but it has continued to bother sensitive moralists.²⁰ Perhaps a reflection of the same concern is to be found in the Messianic myths of the Old Testament in which in the new age human life and animal life are seen at peace together.²¹

Human life lives also by the exploitation and destruction of other human life. There is not enough room in the world, there is not enough food for all men to enjoy equally the necessities of physical existence. This means simply that every one who enjoys enough of the world's goods is taking them from some other human being. Fritz Kreisler says that he never has a bottle of milk for breakfast without realizing that he is taking it away from some helpless person who needs it more than he does. Yet life is physical, and if there is to be life at all, someone must fight for and win the goods of life. The usual conclusion that we ourselves should be the ones to win out is a *non sequitur*. Here is the tragic paradox in the command to seek first the Kingdom and then all other things will be added unto us, for in this world these "other things" are sought, fought for, and kept. This fight for life against other life is the basis of Niebuhr's conclusions that logically every life

²⁰Cf. Richard Niebuhr, "Value Theory in Theology" in the volume *The Nature of Religious Experience* (New York: Harper, 1937), p. 109.

²¹Isaiah 11:6-9.

deserves destruction.²² It would be truer to say that every life deserves both to live and to die, for every life has potentiality of adding value to the world at the same time that it destroys other value in order to exist.

The second aspect of tragedy in the involvement of good will with the world's struggle for power is that since the physical and social powers of the world are more selfish than love they constantly tend to corrupt the spirit of love which relates itself to them. Pacifist theory may attempt to draw a line between the persuasive power of love and the coercive power of emotion; but it is exceedingly difficult to do. The spirit of agape inevitably becomes mingled with the spirit of eros in human living. Religious mysticism and religious nationalism both offer ample evidence.

The third result of the involvement of the good with existing powers is that good thereby becomes involved in evil, for the conflict of powers causes destruction and other evils which mutuality might have overcome. To remind us of this fact is the indispensable witness of pacifism. Fighting always involves evils; it builds up resentment, it perverts truth, it corrupts the moral sense. The evidence for this truth is overwhelming both from the clinical treatment of individual psychological problems and from the results of human warfare. He who accepts the method of forcible resistance to any power must accept responsibility for involvement in evil. For those who do not know what else to do, the full pathos of man's situation becomes revealed. "That which we would, we do not, that which we would not, that we do. Who will deliver us from this body of death?"

Faced with an inability in ourselves to break out of the vicious circle, faced with the fact that there are powers of the world which effectively block the realization of the order of Christian community, we can find our own reasons for being modest about claiming that we are building the Kingdom of God. The orders of the world do not lend themselves to direct reconstruction according to the pattern of good will alone. Certainly we must do what we can for such good as we can; but the triumph of the goodness of God is something for which we wait. "The whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now. And not only they, but ourselves also which have the first fruits of the Spirit, even we our-

²²Reinhold Niebuhr, *Reflections on the End of an Era* (New York: Scribners, 1936), p. 285.

selves, groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body. For we are saved by hope."²³

III.

Saved by hope! Does not Paul's word show the way out? It is in time that the solution of the human problem lies. Of course the world is far from the Kingdom. Of course the very struggle for a Christian world involves us in evil; but "the world is young yet and history has a long way to go."²⁴ God give us time, nay, God has given us time, and our hope is for that future in which the meek shall inherit the earth.²⁵

Unfortunately, the fact or time does not offer quite so simple a solution of the problem of human despair. Indeed time offers its own peculiar contribution to the tragedy of the human scene.

One reason time does not offer a solution is that the ambiguities of value and the corruption of good will in the struggle for power are not overcome in the course of time, but simply take new forms. To be sure, difference of opinion exists on this point. The reality of progress is at least debatable. If the victory of good means the organization of life into that community in which conflict and suffering become contributory to the value of the whole, it may be possible to find some ground for believing that such a progressive organization of life can take place, and in some measure has taken place.

If the world economy were organized on the basis of mutuality the sharpness and cruelty of the struggle might be at least greatly mitigated. Professor John Bennett in his *Social Salvation*, published in 1935, listed certain evidences of progress:²⁶ (1) Increase in the possibilities of human welfare through technical control of the physical environment and social organization. (2) Gains in public opinion and the public conscience seen in the fact that the civilized world has turned its back upon the following evils: human sacrifice, religious persecution, the subjection of women, slavery, punishment without trial, the use of torture by responsible authorities, duelling to kill, the uncontrolled exploitation of men, women,

²³Romans 8:22-24.

²⁴Harry Emerson Fosdick in a sermon preached in the University of Chicago Chapel, May 1940.

²⁵Cf. Max Otto: *The Human Enterprise* (New York: Crofts, 1940), pp. 366-369.

²⁶John Bennett, *Social Salvation* (New York: Scribners, 1935), pp. 151-163.

and children in industry, irresponsible government, the right of a nation to wage war in the pursuit of any policy without regard to any international sanctions. (3) The cumulative influence of persons moved by faith and love. (4) The self-defeating character of evil. Professor Bennett's list of gains certainly is optimistic. With the possible exception of human sacrifice and duelling, all the evils he mentions are rampant today.

John Macmurray believes that the structure of universal community is so basic to the total order of life that every social order which denies it inevitably destroys itself, and that therefore we may hope for the actual achievement of the good society on earth.²⁷ His thesis at present has even more difficulty with the facts than Professor Bennett's. The latter speaks only of the possibility of progress; but Macmurray defends the doctrine of its inevitability. His realistic warning in *The Clue to History* that a new will to power might develop in Russia has apparently turned out to be a prophecy. One is forced to the conclusion that his belief in progress is based more on faith than fact when he finally admits that though the good society must come, one cannot tell when this will be.

Although Professor Tillich denies that there can be any progress in creative works of culture or in human morality, he does hold that persons and groups may so appreciate and receive the spirit of love that they become the bearers of the meaning of history. "The spirit of salvation radiating from those personalities and groups is the power which again and again overcomes the demonic self-destruction of historical existence."²⁸ While the demonic may be subdued and concrete forms of it from time to time may be broken, we have no basis which would permit us to say that it can be "extirpated." Tillich says "to expect not only that the power of existing demonic forces will be broken at definite periods in history, but that in some future age the demonic as a whole will be utterly destroyed, is a religious 'utopianism' which should be regarded as quite untenable."²⁹

Further reason for doubting the validity of a doctrine of the gradual purification of life through historical progress is the dependence of moral value upon moral freedom. The qualities of loyalty, mercy, forgiveness, love, depend in part for their value

²⁷John Macmurray, *The Clue to History* (New York: Harpers, 1939).

²⁸Tillich, *The Kingdom of God and History*, p. 126.

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 127.

upon man's freedom to reject them. So long as man remains man he must walk the knife-edge between good and evil. In Niebuhr's words, "mere development of what he now is cannot save man, for development will heighten all the contradictions in which he stands."³⁰

A qualified conception of progress toward the Kingdom of God remains significant for all three views just quoted. Although the evidence does not permit us to hope for a permanent overcoming of evil by good, what is left is hope for the possibility of the occasional partial growth of the order of community in the world. The victory of good is constituted partly by the growth of community, and partly by the fact that the fragmentary order of love in the world points beyond itself to the eternal pattern of the good which both sustains and judges every existing order.

To be temporal is to die. Persons die, and the visible world is dying. The world may end, says Professor Montague, either in a bang or in a swish, but it will end. Here lies the deepest problem which the temporal character of the world poses for Christian hope. The future is the realm of new possibilities; but it is also the abyss in which all existing things disappear. Orthodox theology has always taken the destruction of value by death with utmost seriousness; and speaks of redemption as being redemption from sin *and from death*. A new dimension is added to human hope if man can believe that the values achieved in time endure for eternity. As Professor Hocking points out, duration is a dimension of value.³¹ Therefore, the valuer cannot face without protest the death of the human carriers of value and the death of the world which sustains life. "Yea, the work of our hands, establish thou it."

The idea of personal immortality has been one answer of Christian thought to Time, the destroyer; but the survival of the soul, if true, does not wholly solve the problem. All the concrete values of existence which are inconceivable apart from their material basis would still be at the mercy of the world's dissolution. The traditional doctrine of the resurrection of the body met the difficulty more squarely by anticipating the actual preservation of all the real constituents of worldly existence in the new order.

Whitehead's doctrine of objective immortality is a metaphysical

³⁰Reinhold Niebuhr, *Beyond Tragedy* (New York: Scribners, 1937), p. 306.

³¹W. E. Hocking, *Thoughts on Death and Life* (New York: Harper, 1937).

reinterpretation of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. It is the whole body of the order of value which is preserved in the being of God. Every concrete value is preserved in the eternal movement of God from the past into the future.³² Professor Hartshorne expresses the same doctrine in idealistic terms by saying that in God's memory the concrete values of existence are eternally treasured.³³ He holds that the problem is crucial on the ground that unless some value is preserved in eternity there can be no meaning in life at all.³⁴

The difficulty with all doctrines of immortality is to find evidence to support the belief. Naturalistic philosophies which do not share Professor Hartshorne's faith in reason generally refuse to predict the ultimate fate of the goods of human existence. Hartshorne accuses Dewey of having never even raised the simple question of the fact of death as a "nullification of human efforts." Naturalists usually reply that the values of existence are genuine values regardless of their ultimate fate. The good is victorious over time in so far as that which is even partially good achieves some foothold in the midst of time. Some victory, of some good, for some time is possible. Whatever that good may be, the religious man hopes for it, lives for it, dies for it, knowing that the ultimate creativity of the universe sustains him.

Because these problems are inescapably there in the human situation, and because we have not always recognized them in our theologies of progress, we are faced today with the task of reformulating our Christian hopes. The task is painful, since it involves the achievement of a new perspective upon the meaning of life. We do know that on the other side of human tragedy Christianity has always laid hold of an assurance that God may be trusted to overcome the world. If that assurance is possible for us, it must come through facing the problems of the ambiguity, the weakness, and the temporal character of all the good we know. To insist upon this is probably to confess that one is not an optimist in the conventional sense of the term, yet in a world such as ours it may be gain rather than loss to have romantic optimism replaced by an appropriate humility. Even the Christian may be "perplexed, but not unto despair."

³²A. N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, pp. 531 f.

³³C. Hartshorne, *Beyond Humanism* (Chicago: Willett Clark, 1937), p. 17.

³⁴*Ibid*, p. 14.

A Public Servant*

VON OGDEN VOGT

Morton Denison Hull

Legislator - Churchman - Philanthropist

*For twenty-five years a member of the Illinois General Assembly and of the Congress of the United States. :+ :
For forty years a trustee of this church. Donor of this building. :+ : Throughout his life a generous giver to causes of social good. :+ : His constant concern for the welfare of persons and of nations derived from his living religious faith.*

The above legend is the text of the tablet which we dedicate today, almost four years after his death, to the memory of a man who was truly a public servant. He was a leader of the people, wise and good, for a description of whose life one naturally recalls the New Testament aphorism, "Whosoever would be chiefest among you, let him be servant of all."

Mr. Hull's life was a singularly unified one, all of a piece, well knit together by strong principles into a consistent whole. Yet outwardly he lived several lives, each one well known to many people who knew very little of the others. The church world knew him from his youth up as an active and vigorous leader in the local and national affairs of the Unitarian churches, but was little acquainted with his political career. The doings of many years, largely away from home, in the halls of legislatures, were but vaguely understood by those who knew him as a never-failing friend of philanthropic movements. Meanwhile, overlooked by all excepting a very few, was his continual direction of large enterprises of business. Although Mr. Hull inherited a considerable fortune, much of the wealth which made possible his large giving and his freedom for public service was the result of his own skill

*The text of a sermon delivered by the minister at the First Unitarian Church of Chicago on Sunday morning, May 11, 1941.

and labor. Meanwhile, moreover, let no one think of him as a man of virtue merely, stern and preoccupied with ideas and affairs. He was also a man of personal charm and ample gifts of human companionship. Always just beneath an austere surface lay a rich humor, ever ready for a witty retort or a droll remark. With all his heavy responsibilities for public affairs, he never lost, as the inscription on the tablet says, his "constant concern for persons."

The youth of our friend came at a time before the present forms of social service, when it was natural to think of public service in terms of politics. There was much political talk in his own Chicago home and he was greatly influenced by the political ideas and activities of his maternal grandfather back in New York state. After his graduation from Harvard College, his studies at the Harvard Law School widened his public outlook. Some of his correspondence of those days with his father contained vigorous arguments respecting civil service reform.

Legislator

Thus it came about, after the circumstances of his early professional life permitted, that he became active in local politics, serving a somewhat rough apprenticeship in the civic and party organizations of Chicago, a city sometimes alleged to be a tough one in politics. Then he entered the General Assembly of Illinois, of which he was a member in the House and in the Senate, for over fifteen years. At once he did unusual things, engaging a secretary to make for himself and other legislators, clear digests of intricate bills, and hiring a house as a place for the discussion of measures with a group of friends. Early he acquired a reputation as a man of full and accurate information. The *Chicago Daily News* said of him, "Ending his first term in the senate, following four terms in the legislature, Mr. Hull is the most valuable man in the legislature. He is an expert in all legislative matters and is very active in working for the enactment of progressive legislation." Early also, he became known and respected for his independent and incorruptible character. Said one of his opponents one day, "Boys, this bird Hull is a dangerous man. God only knows . . . what would happen if this guy got elected governor. They say he's Deneens' candidate. Say, he ain't anything's or anybody's candidate." At the same time he was an intensely practical politician, making friendly association with rough men and seeing the frequent need for com-

promise. Often revolting against party candidates or party measures, he was a stout believer in party organization. He had a great disdain for those who refused the loyalties and disciplines of practical politics, as witness the following: "I know how hateful the word 'organization' is to many good people when used in connection with politics. They wish to be free from the dictation of political leaders—yes, free also from the responsibility of building any better political organization themselves, free to criticize and without obligation to plan or construct. This strikes me as the acme of political impotence."

During these years at Springfield, Mr. Hull promoted many measures of progressive legislation relating to civil service reform, workman's compensation, hours for women, treasury deposits, railway regulation, occupational diseases, loan sharks, primary laws and others. His fine spirit is nowhere more unconsciously or clearly manifest than in his own words respecting a measure of his concerning aliens: "I am convinced the thing that will help most to make aliens real Americans is a realization of the fact that we wish to see them advance. . . . It was my purpose in introducing this bill to bring to an end the shameful exploitation of the alien, so common upon his arrival in this country and especially in large cities." It may fairly be said that he not only supported good measures but that many of these would never have been initiated at all or carried through except for his advocacy. He was indeed an idealist in politics. Too often that is the same as saying that a man is impotent in politics. Not so in his case. He was a political success, and that despite the further fact that he was not brilliant, dramatic nor oratorical. Why did he succeed? Because he was dependable and associative as well as independent, stubborn and persistent as well as compromising, because he was always master of the facts and set them forth with a clear logic, because he never failed in good will or courtesy, and perhaps not least because of his gift of humor. On one occasion he nearly upset the session and ended a prolonged and somewhat foolish discussion by rising to say, "This bill respecting liens on tombstones is entirely too grave a matter for settlement in this light manner." Amongst the most valued of the closing labors for his own state was his constructive leadership in the Illinois Constitutional Convention.

So deeply was his heart and mind engaged in these first-hand

problems of government that it was with reluctance that he consented to stand for the national legislature. Yet this was inevitable and in 1923 he entered the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States. In Washington he began at once to display the grasp of political principles and political methods which he had attained. To the national arena he carried, too, the same high-minded concern for the welfare of the local community and the individual citizen. One of the most earnest endeavors of all his career was his opposition to the branch banking bill, on the score of its further concentration of economic power and the impoverishment of the small town in personal leadership. Bred in a period of intense competition in American business, Congressman Hull never abandoned the values of individualism in industry, but he did not shrink from proclaiming the necessity for measures which in principle involved a genuine socialization. Let those who object to the interference of government in business at certain points read his rejoinder as to at least one point, "The answer is very simple—because to permit private profit to big business out of the institution of war is to put a premium on war. As long as the ship building industry can get private profit out of contracts running into the hundreds of millions of dollars, it can afford an active and aggressive campaign for more ships. It can ring the alarm bell about the inadequacy of our national defense. It can afford to promote canned editorials circulated over the nation to the country press." This point of view is all the more significant when it is understood that a large part of his own income came from the production of iron ore.

Here we pass over to the field which became Mr. Hull's chief political interest, the field of international affairs. He was early appointed a member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Not a pacifist, he had a sharp nose for every influence that tended to foster the war spirit, well matured conceptions of the instrumentalities necessary to international accord and unflagging devotion to the best agencies of peace propaganda. He was a strong believer in the League of Nations and a vigorous supporter of the American movement to sustain it. In 1930, he was a member of the delegation sent by the American Congress to the meeting in London of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. At that gathering he made an address on the Kellogg Pact in which he maintained that true neutrality toward any violator of the pact was impossible.

There are many today who wish that the measure which he then proposed in the following excerpt might have been enacted into law: "That whenever a President determines and by proclamation declares that any country has violated the Pact of Paris for the renunciation of war, it shall be unlawful to export or to attempt to export from any place in the United States . . . any article of merchandise whatsoever, or to import from such aggressor state any article of merchandise whatsoever which shall have been shipped from the ports of such state subsequent to the issuance of such proclamation, or to make any loan or extend credit to such aggressor state or to its nationals, except by consent of Congress or by proclamation of the President announcing the cessation of the aggression of such offending state."

Perhaps such an action by our government would amount to the sanction of force regarded by some as essential to the transformation of international agreements into the status of international law. In these days when there are many who appear to believe that the spirit of justice can prevail without the regulation of law or conventions become effective without enforcement, it is salutary to study the life of a legislator who was an idealist and a lover of peace but who yet understood the social necessity of law and the futility of law without force.

In Washington Mr. Hull was not only a much respected member of the Congress, but he became the personal associate and counsellor of many of the leading minds in the national government. A lawyer and a law maker, a politician who never disdained the word politics, he became at length a statesman. Never merely a local representative, an Illinois man or Chicago man or party man, he was truly the state's man, with an outlook and a concern which covered the nation as a whole and all its relations and all its people.

Churchman

A legislator, occupied in the making of laws, in framing rules and regulations for the lives of citizens, no one understood better than he the limitations of law, that laws cannot rise much above the popular opinion and spirit that sustain them. He was very skeptical of enforcing virtue by law, as for example in the case of the use of liquor. As a true statesman, sensing the vast, intricate fabric of forces and values, of the commonwealth of ideas, lands, institutions

and peoples that comprise the state, he understood that this fabric cannot be held together by laws alone. He saw that there cannot be any true social order without a precedent spiritual order and that spiritual order can be nothing less than religion. With equal clarity he saw that there can be no politically effective religion without a church. Just as he had little respect for those who were merely patriotic in general, avoiding definite political responsibility, so had he little admiration for those who were merely religious in general without any personal practise of church adherence. Often on his lips was the old phrase "church and state" because these two ancient institutions were deep loyalties in his life.

Although I have some inklings of it, I do not know the full story of his religious education. By a coincidence it happens that the minister of his church during the years when some intellectual definition of religious faiths is natural was William Wallace Fenn, and that later I was a student of Dean Fenn's at Harvard. It is doubtless not a coincidence that some of the conceptions of the distinguished layman were the same as those of the distinguished theologian. In any case it seems clear that religion was primary and personal with him before he developed a matured philosophy of its relation to politics and society. As his father before him was treasurer of the First Unitarian Society, he also was a trustee, from early manhood until his death, for much of that time chairman of the board. After the death of his father and mother, both of whom had been signal in their devotion to the church, he joined his sister in building to their memory the chapel near the University of Chicago to which not long thereafter the whole work of the First Church was removed.

Naturally he was drawn into the wider work of the Unitarian churches, always responding to the frequent calls for help for various of their enterprizes. For years he was a director of the national Laymen's League. Especially did he give large amounts of time and money to the work of The Meadville Theological School. During his chairmanship of the board of trustees, against many obstacles, the school was brought from Pennsylvania and established anew in Chicago. Often have Dr. Franklin Southworth, the then president of the school, and Dr. Sydney B. Snow, its present head, expressed their indebtedness to Mr. Hull's wisdom, tact, persistence and generosity during this critical period in the life of the school and of theological education. It was he who

bore the brunt of argument and opposition, it was he who purchased the properties for the new building, the dormitory residence and the president's house.

Yet it was the local parish that was his chief concern and one might almost say the very center of his life work. Often during the early years of the present ministry, after the church had been at a low ebb, he came all the way from Washington chiefly to attend the Sunday morning service. Constantly his thoughts were upon its projects, problems and possibilities. At length when there was promise that it might greatly enlarge the prospective work and usefulness of the church, he built the present superb and beautiful structure. He was in hearty accord with the plan to develop a symbolism in the building expressive of the ethical and social implications of religion. Later, he was always glad to find the building used for a variety of community affairs as well as those of the church, the Meadville School and the Fifty-Seventh Street Meeting of Friends. Which brings us to the other leading phase of his life, that of philanthropy.

Philanthropist

Now-a-days it is common to regard good religion as little more than good ethics and to judge the church by its immediate influence in civic and social affairs. Mr. Hull held no such simple or shallow view. He knew that the religious experience is an end in itself as well as the source of virtue, the giver of high satisfaction as well as of charity, and that it is this end aspect of religion which kindles the welding fires of social cohesion and yields by-products essential to social order, courage, fidelity, and dignity. The greatest social or political value of the church is thus not so much in what it does as in what it is, in just being itself, a rich and wondrous good available to all. Yet with equal truth, a large part of what it is, is its concern for the total welfare of persons, to do good to them as well as to be a good for them. It is no mere chance that many churchmen are also philanthropists. There were other philanthropic men and women in the same parish during the active years of Mr. Hull's life, some of whom gave large sums to colleges and hospitals, some of them long years of generous service to civic institutions. Like them, he was a generous giver. It is impossible to uncover the extent of his benevolences. His annual list reads like a manual of social service agencies. I know that his

aid to individuals and to families was extensive. He made notable gifts for public health and the investigation of diseases. He endowed two university professorships and frequently aided institutions of education, including those for colored people. To judge by the devotion of time as well as money, the major line of his secular philanthropy was the cause of international order and peace. He was an active director of the Church Peace Union, and from the beginning a trustee and chief supporter of the League of Nations Association. To the work of this latter he contributed considerable sums for many years. To the same ends he assisted many peace conferences and movements. It stands to reason, of course, ours as well as his, that being the man he was, his chief philanthropies should be the direct works of religion, as already indicated. He had so sound a philosophy of society and of government, such wide experience of human nature, such a wise, tolerant and friendly spirit in his associations with his fellow men, such a stout conviction of the major importance of religion as a personal need and a social force, such a clear-minded sense of right proportions, that he must needs give the church the primary place amongst essential institutions. To it he gave without measure and without stint, both financially and personally.

The Public Servant

Here then is a fairly complete picture of the public servant. Many might say that the story of his political career was an ample pattern of public service. He would not himself have said so. It takes more than a mere fisherman to be the "compleat angler," so also more than a mere office holder, however intelligent or devoted, to be the complete public servant. What more? The answer is, a deeper penetration of understanding and a wider range of action. Countless numbers of people are active in works of public good, but by circumstance or imagination greatly limited. Beyond their work and family life, only one or two lines of service are possible for most people. In small towns with few institutions, some men and women understand the whole community and act responsibly in it. In the great city, who is there who knows the whole story or surveys the whole scene? Are there any men who are masters of the colossal machinery of modern life? Who is sufficient for these things? Certainly Mr. Hull was not, as no one man can be. Yet there are few men who more nearly than he ap-

proach the stature of the complete public servant. He had a penetrating understanding of a great variety of social factors and participated in the full range of social forces.

A Living Faith

Such a life is not built upon the hay, straw, and stubble of weak convictions or feeble faiths, but upon a solid religious foundation. Mr. Hull's religion was not a shallow one. He believed in man and in God, not in any readily spoken or easy-going manner, but in a deep-seated and living way. He knew very well the disagreeable aspects of human nature but was never cynical. He preferred always to appeal to the nobler side of men, believing that at last the response would come. Always he stoutly defended the idea of the worth of all persons. As he believed in the dignity of man, he believed also in the supremacy of God. Here too his thought was hard-bitten, perhaps not very close to that of popular piety, but certainly very moving in his own personal life. His own simplicity and generosity, his confidence in other men, his hope for the state and his love of the church were based upon his faith in God. He believed that a free and ordered structure of life was possible for any man and that the structure of a free order of society was possible because he believed that the universe itself is an ordered structure. He believed that the world is not mechanical but under an ultimate order that is spiritual, which order of nature is itself the nature and being of God. That this austere but vigorous faith was not of the mind only but something to be applied to every aspect of his practical life was patent to all who knew him. What was not so obvious, except to a smaller number, was his enjoyment of it. His religion, whether private or social as expressed in the regular services of the church, was not limited to ideas and to duties, it was also fulfillment and joy. In that supreme experience which we call the worship of God he found an exceeding great reward and high happiness.

The magnificence of the life of Morton Hull lies in its wholeness, its completeness, in the full-orbed character of his thought and his life activity in the worship of God and the service of man.

"His constant concern for the welfare of persons and of nations derived from his living religious faith."

The Religious Socialist in the World Crisis*

Part II

GERHARD E. O. MEYER

Before we apply the preceding interpretation of Christian ethics to the world of politics, let us summarize the main contentions in a somewhat different form. To the extent that, by divine grace and human acceptance, faith and agape enter our lives, our concrete situation in nature and history becomes meaningful as a trust and a challenge, as the condition of our "creative creatureliness" and our "creaturely creativity." In the relative sense in which it could be said of finite and sinful men, Christian persons and groups are tending to "fulfil their time"; they neither try to escape from it nor do they simply accept it in the spirit of satisfied complacency, or indifference, or submission to blind, mechanical necessity. Rather, "fulfilment" means to them radical transformation of themselves and of their world. If this way of life is really radical, it is at once conservative and critical *in the direction of the best potentialities* that agape can discover in their world, conserving and renewing those which are already existing and still relevant, as well as exploring and realizing new and better solutions of personal and group problems. Such an attitude may be called Christian or prophetic realism. It is equally far removed from pure absolutism and from pure relativism, from voluntaristic idealism and from historical fatalism. As long as it has not come completely into its own, that is, in history, agape does not effect—nor does it immediately and abstractly intend to effect—a complete abolition of all conflicts and tragedies between and within men. Rather, the functions of agape are threefold: it helps to discern the real from the imaginary and because of that the more demonic conflicts; it provides a supreme criterion of criteria for the "solution" of conflicts or their elevation to a higher level; and it creates and revises among men a hidden or open community of worship and action, of response and responsibility. Thus it tends both to overcome the ultimately cynical and selfish lukewarmness of indifference and to transform our idol-centered mutually exclusive

*Part I of this article appeared in the Winter 1942 issue of this JOURNAL.

aspirations, prides and hatreds into what Milton called "moderate varieties and brotherly dissimilitudes," the very precondition of a non-demonic common pursuit of truth, liberty and justice among differing finite men.

For the realm of politics, it is especially important to realize how this "Christian realism," wherever it is practiced, avoids the two closely related pitfalls of skeptical cynicism on the one side and mere moralism on the other. In the former case, either God's power or His love or both are denied, and practical cynicism is the logical result. For such an attitude implies either denying the fact of human sinfulness or, if the fact is admitted, throwing the responsibility for it upon God. In both cases, lack of agape—attitudes and actions destructive of life and meaning—is made into a human virtue. The basic difficulty with this negative projection of human characteristics onto God, which may be expressed even in a very idealistic language, seems to lie in its attempt to talk about God really in the *third* person. It is true that theology as the representation and affirmation of spiritual transcendence through the medium of human reason, also speaks of God in the third person. However, the use of the third person is here merely an attribute of the medium and not of the content to be communicated; theology remains essentially a rational form of prayer. If one stands before God, or if one really wants to stand before Him, it is necessarily in a Thou-I or Thou-We relation and then it is utterly impossible to accuse God of a lack of either power or love, to reject His Love and His "command" of love, and to deny either the "fact" of human sin and guilt or man's responsibility for them.¹³ Thus, skeptical cynicism, conceiving of God as a third, absent (uninterested or probably non-existent) person, necessarily misses the crucial point; it is a kind of *negative* transcending of life leading to its destruction. There is another way of distorting or avoiding the "Thou" of faith: to conceive of God in the *first* person: in the field of practical action, this leads to idealistic moralism. Moralism, in principle, substitutes man's moral aspirations and virtues for God's power and goodness, and thereby, most of the time, misses and distorts reality and the real possibilities for improvement of the human situation. It begins as a serious at-

¹³Cf. *I and Thou* by Martin Buber, the Jewish poet and philosopher, published by T. and T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1937.

tempt at avoiding the conclusions of skeptical cynicism. But by aiming rather directly at perfection (conceived as the realization of a system of ideal principles), moralism asserts at least in principle, the perfectibility of man by himself here and now; nature and history are not experienced as dimensions of divine creation, but as a set of obstacles and frictions to be overcome by simple and direct "absolute" moral judgment and action. Thus, moralism tends to dissociate its adherents from reality. This leads to consequences ultimately very similar to those of cynicism. Moralism may mean the rejection of any decision that is made in terms of "better or worse" and the choice of abstractly pure and "good" means irrespective of the consequences. Or it may mean the choice of opportunist or even cynical methods for absolutely "good" ends. The concrete results and the religious significance of these two versions of perfectionist moralism or "utopianism" are not so very different. There is, of course, no denying that in practice "Christian realism" is always imperfect and that it easily can deteriorate into mere verbalism and superficial opportunism; correspondingly, in certain situations, there may be more real agape in either an apparently cynical or apparently idealistic attitude than in the zone of "Christian" thought and action that extends, with indefinite boundaries, to the left and right of that narrow path of "realism." However, all these perils should not keep us from realizing that fundamentally neither a cynical nor a moralistic-utopian attitude are compatible with Christian faith. To these attitudes must be added as a third closely related position an irresponsible religious indifferentism or quietism which is not concerned with this sinful world or refrains from decision and action because in the night of sin all cows are equally black.

(c) *Christianity and politics.* This general attitude toward the world and history, taken by religious socialists, in conformity with genuine Christian tradition, has some important implications for the world of politics. As realists, we have to acknowledge that we live and have to live in organized societies and in a world of power relations; and that means in a world of conflicts, of compromises and even of violence. If we really want to live in the world, though not of it, we have to accept this fundamental fact and make the best of it in a responsible attitude that is neither cynical (Machiavellian) nor perfectionist and utopian. A state, if it has not completely deteriorated, is of course more than the or-

ganization of power relations, more than the temporary outcome of the power game. It is, however imperfectly, the means and expression of collective self-organization, instrumental for the achievement of some degree of justice and order. Nevertheless, the acquisition and maintenance of power in favor of some group and against other groups, is, if not the sole objective, at least a most important and unavoidable aspect of political life. "Power" as such, being an attribute of existence, cannot be bad in itself. Indeed, it is even one of the attributes of love, for love is "good power." Also, the notion of effective freedom cannot be thought of without some connotation of "power." We enter more difficult ground once we consider social power, power of particular men or groups in and over society, especially political power. Political powerholders possess or aim to possess, some monopoly of using organized sanctions against everybody who resists their command; they rely to a considerable degree upon violence or at least upon the threat of violence as well as upon all means of persuasion, even deceitful persuasion. In the Kingdom of God, political power as distinguishable phenomenon would be non-existent. Power as well as law and the very norm of justice would be received into and replaced by the working of the "law" of perfect love between free children of God. In this sense, there is always some imperfection in any political organization and in political power. However, this imperfection may take on extremely different degrees. The state in its relatively highest stage of perfection is the self-organization of free persons for the realization and protection of the most perfect forms of justice. Political power here means freely chosen and accepted leadership in the exploration, determination and execution of policies chosen directly or indirectly by all members of the political community who are considered able to discuss and to decide issues freely and rationally. Such a state may be called a "perfect democracy."¹⁴ The extreme on the other end of the scale need not be described. Suffice it to emphasize that there are better and worse, juster and unjust states. Though the content of the norm "justice" as well as the meaning of different social freedoms—and their relative importance in a comprehensive

¹⁴See Frank H. Knight's many analyses of the political process and of the nature of democracy in particular. The latest formulation of Knight's views is to be found in "The Meaning of Democracy: Its Politico-Economic Structure and Ideals," in *The Journal of Negro Education*, July 1941, pp. 318-332.

concept of freedom—is changing in history, depending on the changing religious, economic and other “social” conditions and convictions, the principle of love, as Tillich has pointed out,¹⁵ is the supreme criterion which enables us to choose *that* interpretation of freedom and justice which is, in a new historical epoch, most creative and relatively best. In this sense (which implies constant re-interpretation and repudiates mere operation with “eternal,” but fairly empty categories) the closely related notions of freedom, justice and equality—the latter being implied in the first two—are the relevant ethical mediating “representatives” of the supreme principle of love in the field of political activity and organization, middle principles that govern also the role of violence in society.

Is this emphasis on freedom as one of the chief criteria for the relative goodness of a state and of political action more than an artificial and ephemeral alloy of Christian principles and eighteenth or nineteenth century liberalism? Certainly it must be conceded that modern liberal-democratic culture, including modern liberal Protestantism, is subject to sharp criticism, for example on account of its rationalistic and utopian tendencies and on account of its idolatrous rationalization of finite historical ideas and achievements. And, in a certain sense, it is true that the hour of this form of autonomy has passed. However, it should not be forgotten that modern liberalism, at least to a large degree, stems from genuine Christian roots, and has realized, within and without the Christian churches, new possibilities of social and personal life that are better than those that existed before. These achievements of liberalism, purified of their demonic aspects, should be received into the Christian tradition, subject to appropriate changes in organizational forms and other reinterpretations which will prove indispensable. In so far as the liberties created by historic liberalism have remained negative and to some degree formal and in so far as they led to self-destructive consequences, a further development, a broadening, deepening, and undergirding of freedoms is today a clear demand of social ethics. However, as far as possible, this reinterpretation and reconstruction of freedom should take place not at the expense of the present forms of economic, cultural and political liberty. These forms have a certain intrinsic value in themselves, and within certain limits they are also instrumentally

¹⁵In “Ethics in a Changing World,” *l.c.*

indispensable as preconditions for the achievement and preservation of any at present conceivable new forms of liberty and justice and equality.

This emphasis on political and other social freedoms is partly based on the conviction that "love" is most closely correlated with freedom, especially spiritual freedom. However, spiritual freedom, if it is not supported by external freedoms of the self, and if it does not result in the promotion and preservation of the fullest possible freedom of the other, is at best incomplete, at worst a fake, that is, a combination of outward indifference or skepticism with a slavish concern for one's self. The medieval notion "*gratia supponit naturam*" (which does not need to be interpreted in a supranaturalistic sense) may be applicable also in our present context: "External" freedoms in themselves are not enough, perhaps they are even dangerous as a product and a cause of sin; but again a merely introversive interpretation of spiritual transcendence is a most serious deviation from the fully developed Christian way of life. Within the limits necessitated by any organized way of living together, it is then a Christian *duty* to live as free men and to treat others as free men; this obligation is—like faith and love themselves—an all-pervasive one which applies to the sphere of politics as well as to other spheres.¹⁰

"Democracy" implies a fusion of liberal and equalitarian principles and institutions. To a very large degree, these two aspects of democracy predispose and support each other. Beyond a certain point (which will vary from one historical situation to the other) it may, of course, happen that either the liberal principles are carried so far as to violate equalitarian principles and ultimately democracy itself, or that equalitarian principles are emphasized so much as to make democracy illiberal and thereby dangerously

¹⁰This treatment of liberty and liberalism represents, perhaps, one of the deviations of the present essay from the views of Tillich and Reinhold Niebuhr. For a criticism of Niebuhr on this score see James L. Adams' article in the symposium on *Human Nature and Destiny in Christendom*, Autumn 1941. As for Tillich, see his contribution to *Freedom, Its Meaning*, ed. by R. N. Anshen, New York, Harcourt Brace and Co., 1940, pp. 123-44, and his series of articles on "War Aims" in *The Protestant*, June-July, August-September, October-November 1941, reprinted also in pamphlet form (Cf. also Footnote 21 below.) However, once it is recalled that in the opinion of the present writer, too, liberalism is no set of eternal principles, applicable to all times, but has to be redefined in every specific new *kairos*, our difference is likely to be merely one of emphasis.

imperfect. However, both these cases are rather clear deviations from the Christian concept of democracy. In this sense, then, it may be said that everything that in the long run is conducive to more just freedom and liberal justice among men, to more democracy, is preferable to an action or a political order that promotes less or even destroys freedom and justice: Democracy is the relatively best norm in social matters, the most acceptable to and most permeable by the spirit of agape. This means no sanctification of democracy as such; it remains always a finite, relative institution or way of life, with essential imperfections. And practically all states are more or less far away from full democracy. Therefore Christians have always to be aware of the imperfections and demonic aspects of actual political institutions and behavior, to criticize them constructively and to work for improvements—without, however, falling into the error of superficial progressivist optimism or perfectionist, chiefly negative, radicalism.

It should be understood that in upholding more fully developed democracies as relatively better than less democratic or antidemocratic orders, we do not mean the “ideologies,” but the realities of political practice. What counts is effective democracy. But effectiveness is not to be evaluated on a short-run basis; rather it implies actions that secure the future life of society and the possibility of further advancements. Such effective action by ordinary citizens, legislators and administrators within and towards democracy requires, on the one side, supporting parallel attitudes and institutions in all the extra-political spheres of social-cultural life. On the other side, effective democratic action implies a realistic, neither cynical nor idealistic, choice of proper *means* in the political sphere itself. Here the problem of violence becomes most urgent. Being destructive and most apt to demonic self-expansion and self-perpetuation, violence is certainly to be minimized in the better political orders. The same principle may be expressed by stating that violence is opposed to the essence of both love and freedom. However, if in a given emergency situation the failure to use force results in anarchy or the victory of a system in which the use of violence is not the exception, but the rule, in which power becomes an end in itself, then peacefulness may be directly contrary to the requirements of “agape in history.” There may be more real love in men who then shoulder their responsibility bravely and who fight the greater evil without self-righteous-

ness. If Christians participate realistically, in the sense interpreted in the whole preceding part of this paper, in such a use of violence and compulsion, they know, of course, that they are deeply involved in sin and historical guilt. Mankind is thrown back by any increase in the use of violence, not only in terms of worldly goods, but even more spiritually. The tragic choice is taken, as always in the human situation where love has to work in a world of sinfulness, between the greater and the smaller "total" of sin and guilt. In this respect, it seems to me to make relatively little difference whether violence consists in the shedding of blood or in starvation by economic means, whether it is used within or between states. An isolation of *particular* modes of violence as ethically different from others appears to involve a failure to recognize the *nature* of the human situation as a whole as well as to overlook the danger of pharisaism. Once it has been decided that the use of violence is indispensable for the maintenance of order and relative justice within and between states, then the choice of the proper forms and degrees of violence is a question of effectiveness with respect to the controlling goal. In such a situation, Christian realism forbids the use of unnecessary violence; it forbids any cynical condoning or praise of power and violence for their own sakes; but it also forbids the moralistic weakening or merely half-hearted support of necessary organized social action whenever it implies coercion and force, on the grounds of short-sighted sentimentalism or "far-sighted" perfectionism.

Narrowing the discussion to the problem of war, does our conclusion represent a wholesale rejection of pacifism? I think it does indeed, *if* pacifism means absolute, perfectionist pacifism. On the other hand, one must concede to pacifism a relative validity as a corrective principle. We all tend to forget or to rationalize the demonic contents and consequences of our actions, especially when collective pride is concerned. Thus, there may be some justification for a prophetic protest against the political sphere as such, for a radical reminder that we should not become engulfed in this world of power politics. Even when we consider Tolstoian Christianity as a dangerous deviation from the center of Christian faith, we still have to acknowledge that Tolstoi's life and teaching, and even more that of many Quakers, is part of the Christian community and requires more than mere rejection, indeed, it deserves even admiration and gratitude. However, much of this absolute

protest against politics as such (which consistently would have to be applied also to other spheres of the "world") is not really prophetic, it is mere rationalistic utopianism. In any case, it contains in itself an element of sin and guilt, as many "absolute pacifists" and "anti-political" Christians would certainly concede. From the point of view of "agape in history," absolute pacifism in internal and international relations can certainly not be the *general norm* for Christians. Peace action is, of course, not necessarily based on absolute pacifism. It may, under given conditions, be a very realistic political action. But then it has to be considered in terms of its total consequences, and in comparison with other alternatives and their consequences. In other words, such a judgment about war and peace would always have to be a *relative* one. Only thus does it stay within the limits of Christian realism. And correspondingly, such a judgment would have to be primarily a *political* one. For though Christian realism obviously is bound to reject the notion "politics is politics" (as well as any other similar notion of autonomous life-compartments), it admits that in history the different spheres or aspects of life are characterized by relatively *specific* necessities and norms which ought to be limited and controlled, but not to be neglected or violated.¹⁷

d. "*Religious Socialism.*" Thus far, we have discussed some of the basic layers of religious-socialist thought. They are likely to be shared by many Christians who do not accept socialist conclusions. We move now one step further and consider the position of the religious socialists as socialists. Let us first dispel some prob-

¹⁷In a private discussion (July 1941) Dr. C. C. Morrison denied that there are many perfectionists and absolutists among present-day American pacifists, as Reinhold Niebuhr has repeatedly maintained. It may be true that most of them have a genuine feeling of solidarity in guilt and sin with other groups, and that they are, therefore, subjectively not self-righteous. However, I think that in an objective sense the criticism of self-righteousness may still be justified if a person's grasp of what constitutes sin and love is too limited and distorted. It is, of course, true that many American pacifists are not *absolute* pacifists, but base their decision more or less on allegedly or really realistic views of the situation, though I personally have met quite a number of divinity students who seemed not really concerned with the consequences but only with the intrinsic qualities of their actions. However, if pacifists as a rule do not *completely* adopt the absolutist and perfectionist position, the latter is still an important ingredient in their attitude, a pull on their conscience without which their decision would probably have been different. In view of this situation, it seems to me very justifiable to isolate and to criticize an "ideal type" of absolute pacifism and thereby to compel Christians to reconsider the basic assumptions underlying their decisions.

able misunderstandings which are due to the misleading label. The religious socialists are not socialists because they consider and accept socialism as a religion. Precisely the opposite is true. A socialist state is not and never will be the Kingdom of God. It is just the function of religious socialists to remove the pseudo-religious, utopian element from all the existing types of socialist movements. "Religious socialists" have rather consistently pointed out that in the existing movements aiming at the realization of a socialist order and also in all realized socialist societies there exists and will exist sin and imperfection—not only as something which will hinder the full realization of socialism, but also in the very foundations of such a society and movement. The religious socialists believe that by combating illusionary utopianism in all its many versions and by equally combating inhuman cynicism, they will do socialism the best possible service and reduce the amount of suffering and disillusionment connected with it.

Some people also think that the main purpose of religious socialists is to direct the forces of the Christian religion into the socialist camp. Even pious and sincere people do, indeed, consider religions and churches as a kind of "power station" that should be used to "vitalize" or strengthen some political order or movement, be it monarchy or democracy or socialism. This is to put the cart before the horse and, if meant seriously, would constitute a terrible blasphemy. But actually, though the influx of Christian realism might really further the socialist movement and also break down resistances in middle class groups, this, if it happens, is rather a consequence and by-product of religious socialism and not its justification.

What, then, is the positive view of religious socialism with respect to socialism? First, religious socialism constitutes a kind of protest against various traditional attitudes of the Christian churches: namely, against those who have tended to sanctify and esteem as practically absolute either a feudal order or a capitalistic "bourgeois" order; secondly, against those groups who think only in terms of personal ethics and neglect the social order and the social basis of individual character and action; thirdly, against those Christians who consider themselves too good for participation in an admittedly very imperfect, confused and morally often dubious socialist labor movement. On the other hand, religious socialists are in favor of a vigorous, realistic socialism that pre-

serves, in new forms, a synthesis between justice and freedom under modern conditions of large-scale techniques and organizations, as the *relatively best* way out of the shortcomings and destructive contradictions of present society. Admittedly, they have tended often to neglect the most likely shortcomings of an established socialist order and the difficulties to be faced in the process of realization. In particular did they neglect for a long time the implications of a revolutionary change and of the concentration of power in the hands of a centralized socialist bureaucracy. Also they tended to idealize "the proletariat" and proletarian movements because of the particular "exposedness," meaninglessness and de-personalization of the proletarian situation on the one side, and because of personal guilt-feelings on the other side. Thus many cynical or utopian symbols and actions were condoned or accepted without qualifications. However, on their own principles, religious socialists were bound to look for those probable shortcomings and dangers and have done so. Thus, they are now in favor of socialism with rather few illusions. They would probably accept any historically possible, better alternative—better in terms of its permanent results (in which the costs of transition would have to be included). Religious socialists would, however, be most reluctant to give in to the liberal critics of socialism who maintain that socialist collectivism would *necessarily* lead to authoritarianism and tyranny. They would first insist that this is, indeed, a serious danger, but no inevitable necessity, since a more liberal, decentralized form of collectivism is conceivable and within reach of realization, a collectivism which would preserve sufficient spheres of freedom to prevent dictatorial encroachments—if people want to resist them. This latter condition, however, is not completely determined by the economic set-up. They would secondly maintain that, with all their terrible perversions and dangers, there is in modern collectivist tendencies of the democratic kind a genuine and historically most relevant element, namely, their longing for more material justice, equality and security. All these objectives *may* be mere rationalistic or naturalistic this-worldliness, a higher form of selfishness and idolatry. But it need not be so, at least not only so.¹⁸ Turning from defense to counter-attack, religious socialists

¹⁸It seems hardly necessary, however, to answer those critics who in an idealistic manner complain about the "materialism" of the socialist move-

would also point to deficiencies and even demonic aspects of modern "vulgar liberalism," that is, to the typical distortions and abuses of liberal principles in the name of special interests on the one side, and to their counterpart, the largely irrational semi-collectivistic and monopolistic trends in pressure-group democracies on the other side. These dangerous tendencies, it seems, cannot be overcome by a "return" to classical liberalism, but only by a new alliance of liberal and socialistic movements.¹⁹ This new synthesis in theory and practice—which has scarcely begun to be recognized in spite of its urgency—is certainly one of the major tasks of religious socialists. Being a very small and somewhat esoteric group, they would not claim to possess sufficient insight, courage and influence to master the problem effectively on their own strength, but might well become a significant contributing factor in the solution of the present world crisis. For the crisis both of liberalism and of socialism which is manifested by the contrast between their ethical-historical desirability and their actual impotence and confusion, is but a partial aspect of a much more comprehensive and fundamental world crisis in which the very existence of Christianity and all semi-Christian modern movements is at stake.

ments (or of modern times generally) and typically end by quoting that "men live not by bread alone." Not infrequently, these critics have a cake of their own to defend. In any case, an evaluation of "culture" and in particular of "religion" as a "higher good" in the sense of an object preferably to be possessed, is itself a kind of "higher materialism." It lacks that critical element even towards religion itself that is contained in the attitude of "in, but not of this world," and concentrates all asceticism upon the sphere of "lower," "material" satisfactions—especially as far as other people are concerned. Indeed, many people who are so interested in the reemployment and redistribution of religious resources seem to use religion as a substitute, as an "opium."

¹⁹The literature on liberal, more decentralized socialism has grown rather rapidly in recent years. It may suffice to refer generally to the many writings of Eduard Heimann, a religious socialist, and especially to Oscar Lange and Fred M. Taylor, *On the Economic Theory of Socialism*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1938. The most important critic of this as well as of other forms of collectivism is Professor Frank Knight; see especially his article "Socialism: The Nature of the Problem" in *Ethics*, Vol. L, No. 3 (April 1940). Professor Knight seems to me correct in his complaint that up to now most liberal socialists have neglected the political implications of their proposals or have made rather naive assumptions. However, Knight's own pessimistic outlook, based on his view of human nature in general and of the Russian experiences in particular, seems to me equally open to the charge of uncritical generalization and overstatement.

On the other side, the present writer is to a large extent in agreement with the liberals' criticism of the actual policies of socialist and non-socialist labor groups and other "progressive" groups. (See especially

II. *The attitude of religious socialism toward the present world crisis.*

a. *The nature and extent of the present world crisis.*

In discussing the nature of the present world crisis, the most important point to note is the obvious fact that the present war is but a symptom, the final acute phase of a deeper-lying crisis. This crisis is a "world crisis" not only and not so much in a geographical sense: it is the gradually developing and now acute crisis of a whole way of life that was characteristic, in spite of many differences, of the whole Western world. The development of German fascism and of other totalitarian-authoritarian movements and social structures is a symptom, a consequence as well as a contributing factor, in the crisis of Western culture and society. This new world-counter-revolution grew from within and is not simply an alien body imported from Mars by some adverse fate or deity. If we do not overcome it by regeneration on all levels of existence, from the most spiritual down to the most material, this revolt may well become the nemesis of liberal culture, of democracy, of socialism, and perhaps even of Christianity. The forces which have arisen in national socialism and partly also in Russian communism (the latter may however yet regenerate) are deadly dangers. And they are deadly precisely because they were and are growing out of the very roots of Western society and culture itself. Hitler-Germany is the demonic result of tendencies and counter-tendencies which were gradually straining, disintegrating and eroding the very

Henry C. Simons' valuable pamphlet *A Positive Program for Laissez Faire*, Public Policy Pamphlet No. 15, Chicago, 1934.) Indeed, the policy of furthering more or less monopolistic concentrations of economic power in a democracy of economic-political pressure groups increases rather than decreases economic evils and threatens to weaken or even to destroy democracy in favor of a strong, authoritarian state. "Syndicalism" of this kind stands in sharp contradiction to a socialism that tries to reaffirm and to secure personal liberties within a more stable framework of social institutions. The tendencies toward "syndicalism" and ultimately illiberal collectivism are, of course, deeply rooted in the institutional, psychological and partly even in the technological structure of modern society. (See Edward A. Shils' review of K. Mannheim's *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*, in this JOURNAL, Vol. II, No. 3). It would be unjust to blame only labor for what other groups do, too. And any critic has to work out a concrete better alternative program and has to show a willingness to cooperate even under very imperfect conditions. All this involves a very difficult task. However, if it is not done, socialists and especially religious socialists have only to blame themselves if mankind "falls back" much more than it *needs* to do in the present crisis of liberal-democratic society.

structure and core of Western thought and social life, including its Christian layers. It was rather inevitable that this crisis should lead to a violent conflict, to a World civil war and World religious war. The absolutizing of the irrational factors of human life, of nation or state or of "naked power" either for its own sake or in the name of a world mission on the one side, the defensive claims and especially the half-weakness of the Western democratic countries on the other side—all this made the outbreak of a major conflict only a question of time. The real crisis, then, consists not in the rise of fascism alone, nor in the weaknesses of Western democracies alone, but in the fact that both these phenomena are very deeply interrelated with each other, in the fact that the conflict is one of the most "existential" ones in the whole of known history, a conflict of life and death, and finally in the fact that it is a "*total*" crisis, in other words a spiritual crisis in the most comprehensive and realistic meaning of the term.

b. *Causes of the world crisis.* What are the causes of this rise of totalitarian movements addicted to a peculiarly violent and effective political religion and of the relative external and internal weakness of modern democracies? Socialists usually emphasize the economic factors which tended to bring about serious weaknesses in the functioning of modern "capitalistic" economy. They point to the symptoms of this relative decline which lead to international economic rivalry and even war: the growth of modern large-scale enterprise, the decline of competition and the growth of monopoly—partly a result of political factors, the severity of cyclical depressions and unemployment, the growth in real or apparent inequality of income distribution and economic power, the growing interference of government in business partly in favor of more and more organized labor and farmer groups, partly in favor of business itself, and so on. The "religious socialists" share this analysis to a high degree, though sometimes with some misgivings about overstatements. But they would all, I think, emphasize that an explanation of the present crisis and of the war in particular in terms of *mere* "economic" factors is dangerously simplistic. These economic factors are intertwined with other factors, and it is certainly not true that only or even mainly economic-capitalistic factors are responsible for this war. The practical danger of such a one-sided explanation is especially important when the conclusion is drawn that wars will disappear only, but surely, with the dis-

appearance or breakdown of capitalist society and that therefore one should not participate in this "capitalistic-imperialistic" war, but work for the social revolution or some peaceful evolution towards a post-capitalistic, presumably socialist society. Even on the basis of a mere economic interpretation of the present crisis, such a practical conclusion would scarcely follow. It is weakened even more if the one-sidedness of this interpretation is realized.

Next we come to so-called "political" factors which weakened the democracies and favored the development of anti-democratic movements and state formation. Here most people think first of Versailles, the nationalism of the Western powers, the revival of German nationalism, the difficulties of the Weimar Republic, the ambiguous and contradictory behavior of the Western powers toward Weimar and Hitler Germany, toward China, Ethiopia and Spain, the crumbling of the League of Nations, and so on. All these events and processes have their significance, but in the main they are merely surface phenomena and intermediate causes. Underlying these factors, there were and are the deeper and more gradually working forces that weakened the democratic process from within and exposed the democracies in difficult situations to extreme danger. There are many factors in modern industrial, impersonal, urban society which breed anti-democratic tendencies together with the very rise of mass democracy. The growth of irresponsible unevenly distributed powers in and outside government, bureaucratization everywhere, even in the trade unions and churches, increasing objective and subjective mobility and insecurity as the corollary of change and progress, together with spiritual losses referred to above, all these and many other factors brought about far-reaching disintegration and a loss of common values and of that sense of participation which makes democracy meaningful. It was no accident that these disintegrating forces caused a major crisis and a forceful reaction towards artificial compulsory integration and towards a new political religion in just that country which was economically, politically, socially and spiritually the most exposed and therefore the weakest link in the tenuous structure of Western society: Germany.

On the borderline of political and "ideological" causes for the crisis let us note not only the rise of integral nationalism as a substitute religion but also the growth of utopian rationalism and pacifism—both with respect to internal and international affairs.

This rationalism led on the one side to unrealistic and in the long run unworkable schemes of political organization and on the other side favored the growth and even victory of determined violent, cynical countermovements. These tendencies weakened especially the socialist movement in Germany itself and in all the other countries, too. The tragic inner decline of the socialist movements which has its roots far back in nineteenth century developments and of which the split between socialists and communists is but a symptom, is one of the major proximate causes for the victory of the national-socialist movement and of the threat that the Hitler regime now represents to the whole Western world.

This inner weakness of socialism, its breaking apart into forces of utopianism and mere pacifism on the one side, and its counterpart, cynicism and opportunism on the other side (certain cross-breeds not being forgotten, is, *mutatis mutandis*, shared by practically all other groups and movements in modern society which have maintained some, however indirect, relationship to the main flow of Western culture. These developments are basically critical processes in the sphere of cultural values and even more in the sphere of religion.²⁰ As already indicated, liberalism in all its aspects is in the very center of these processes. It is certainly premature to talk of the "death" of liberal culture as if it were a matter of historical record. If it were so, it would be rather futile to believe that after this war either a regenerated social liberalism or a liberal socialism could be made to prevail. If, however, liberal culture is in a deep crisis, but not yet lost, then the danger might very well be increased by premature obituaries. Fortunately, there is no evidence to prove that liberalism, as theory and as practice, is dead and as to the prediction of its inevitable doom, it may be sufficient that neither empirical observation nor Christian ethics justify any historical fatalism. Prophetic criticism implies always a margin of choice; part of its reconstructive effort is always an appeal to renew the best heritage of the preceding epoch in a new social and spiritual context. In this sense, any too mechanical and

²⁰I hope that in the light of the foregoing, this formulation will not be misunderstood in an idealistic sense. Religion and values are not something in a lofty sphere of their own, but are principles and life-attitudes realizing themselves in and through everyday-life activities, including economics, politics, etc. However, it is not sufficient to discuss only these various concrete manifestations. It is also the "centers" of persons and of cultures that have to be focused upon, at least in an interpretation of a radical crisis from a realistic Christian point of view.

absolute judgment about liberal culture must be rejected, just on the ground of Christian realism. On the other hand, it is, of course, imperative to realize as clearly as possible that, how far, in what respects, and why historical liberalism has become distorted, self-destructive and historically-ethically insufficient and "wrong." It is especially important to realize why liberal society became less and less able to readjust social objectives and institutions to the new economic, political and social realities which were the unexpected results of original liberalism itself, as it developed under rather unfavorable conditions. The answer to all these questions is obviously very complex, but in the present context it may be permitted to put all emphasis upon one fundamental aspect: modern liberal-democratic culture developed contradictory and self-destructive tendencies, primarily because increasingly it lacked support and correction from a genuine Christian realism, out of which it had grown originally.²¹

This takes us back to a consideration of the Christian churches. There is little doubt that the crisis of liberalism and socialism which we experience at present, is largely to be debited to the account of Christianity. Correspondingly, we have also to realize that the Nazi reaction to the "Western" way of life is a major event in the history of religion. It represents the rise of a counter-religion, a deadly *challenge* to modern Christianity, nay even more, it is a manifestation of a fundamental crisis *within Christianity itself*. There is little need to discriminate between different varieties of Christianity in this respect. In a sense, they are all equally in-

²¹These sentences contain a certain qualification of Tillich's position as expounded in his brilliant pamphlet on "War Aims," referred to above. Tillich's view is by far the deepest and most challenging contribution to this vital problem. However, apart from a few minor points of difference concerning the desirable organization of Europe after the war, I would question his attitude to the liberal-democratic tradition (*cf.* p. 9, *l.c.*). It is one thing to say that liberal democracy is in a deep crisis and must reform itself radically in a socialist direction and another thing to state that the Protestant era is ending and that "the reality and the idea of that harmony on which the system of liberal democracy was based" has been *destroyed* by the historical process.

Possibly this latter view indicates only a belief that one of the bases of liberal democracy has been destroyed but not liberal democracy itself, but I still feel that the passage as a whole does not do full justice to the nature and the historical possibilities of liberal democracy. In particular, it is misleading to relate nationalistic rivalries to the competitive principal of economic liberalism. Though many liberals compromised liberalism with nationalism, genuine liberalism was and is essentially opposed to nationalism and imperialism. However, these question marks are not intended to overshadow my basic agreement with Tillich's position.

volved, from the most heteronomous to the most autonomous and secularized forms of Christian and semi-Christian beliefs and practices. Certainly, Protestant groups and principles are more directly involved than other varieties. However, it should not be forgotten that Catholicism, in view of its medieval and modern distortions of Christian faith, bears its full measure of responsibility for the fate of modern autonomous liberal culture; it is also not a mere accident that some (not all) powerful Catholic groups helped to wreck democracies more actively than even Prussian Lutherans who submitted to the demonic aspects of power politics or than liberal Christians elsewhere who either indulged in utopianism or were content to rationalize whatever happened. At any rate, whatever the distribution of relative guilt may be, on Christian principles all these groups are bound together in a community of guilt. Furthermore, it will by now be obvious that the great religious counter-revolution of our time threatens *all* Christianity. It obliges all to take stock of their sins of commission and omission as the fundamental cause of the crisis and to assume courageously their positive responsibilities in the attempt to overcome the danger from within and without.

c. What do religious socialists propose to do about the world crisis?

In particular, what do they say to American society and to the American churches? It should, first of all, be clear that America was from the beginning involved in this crisis, whether she knew and liked it or not, simply because she is a part of Western society. Due to the peculiar conditions under which American economy and society were able to develop, the more outward symptoms of the crisis are perhaps not quite as visible as in other countries, although at least the crisis in the sphere of ideas and values seems to me and to other observers here much more advanced in many respects than for instance in Great Britain. And since the present world civil war and world religious war is but the most acute phase of a world-wide chronic disease, one is justified in saying that America was already "in the war" long before the axis powers struck at the United States. Correspondingly, the only relevant question was: how should Americans *act* in this war and toward what objectives? This question was practically settled on December 7, 1941. However, it is still of great practical importance to consider what the most proper attitude of American Christians

toward war in general and toward this war in particular ought to have been. Incidentally, these considerations help to round out the presentation of "religious socialism" by showing its attitude to a quite concrete problem.

The first practical question for American Christians in 1940 and 1941 was whether the United States should actively participate in the war, by economic help to Britain and her allies and, if necessary, even by armed help, or whether they should try to stay out at all costs, even if this meant the victory of Germany and her allies and the defeat of Great Britain. What counsel should the American Churches give in such a situation? Though it is always difficult to establish "principles" and to apply them in such a manner as to cover all possible conditions, certain broad conclusions from the foregoing analysis stand out rather clearly.

The primary answer was and is a negative one: absolute pacifism and perfectionist moralistic criticism of Great Britain and America and corresponding condoning of German expansion were and are out of the question as deeply heretical, being either utopian or, in effect at least, utterly cynical. The question, though of ultimate religious significance, is primarily a political one and must be answered on the basis of political principles, supported and guided by a Christian realism. The facts and necessities of power politics have to be faced squarely and all decisions have to be made in terms of better or worse consequences, not in terms of absolute criteria of intrinsically good or bad actions or motives. The consequences of all politically relevant actions have to be weighed in terms of their relative contribution to the realization of more freedom, justice and democracy. What is at stake for Christians today is really the question how best to preserve and improve those existing democratic values and institutions which are at least relatively acceptable from the point of view of Christian theology and ethics and which are undoubtedly far better than those values and institutions which would be firmly established by a victory of fascism.

Applying these criteria to the situation of 1940 and 1941, with full awareness of the imperfection and guilt involved in any relative historical judgment, one was bound to realize that almost certainly a predominance of pacifism and isolationism in America would lead to Britain's defeat and Hitler's victory, and furthermore to the almost inevitable collapse of what we now have of American

democracy. If America were not to "co-ordinate" herself to a victorious Hitler empire through a process of internal destruction of democracy and of all anti-totalitarian forces, another military conflict between America on the one side and Germany and her allies on the other side was to be expected as unavoidable. In this sense, the real alternatives were not peace versus probable war, but war now versus (much more certain) loss of democracy or war later on. A war later on, however, would have to be faced under much worse political and moral conditions. On the other hand, active help to Britain and especially direct participation in the war, it was to be expected, would also carry serious dangers, not to speak of the immediate losses and sacrifices. Any modern war certainly implies threats to democratic institutions, in particular to all kinds of civil liberties. Emergency controls might be perpetuated even after the war. Certain social reforms which from the democratic and socialist point of view are most important, are likely to be postponed because economic resources are really or allegedly lacking and because interest in these matters has been weakened. However, in gauging the probability and seriousness of these dangers, it always had (and has still) to be remembered that effectiveness in the war effort does not necessarily mean a mechanical imitation of totalitarian practices. Rather, a democratic method of conducting the war which only eliminates dangerous, time-consuming practices and opportunities for hostile propaganda and sabotage, but otherwise encourages active participation of the people in the decision-making and shows them as concretely as possible their "stake" in the democratic state, is probably in the long run much more effective than totalitarian discipline based on blind belief in a leader, on fear of the consequences of defeat and on sheer coercion. Furthermore, whatever losses and dangers to democracy would have to be realistically envisaged, they would still have to be weighed against the much more certain and much more final and serious dangers to the same rights and aspirations in the case of a German victory.

Most religious socialists I know of, therefore, have opposed sharply the pacifism and isolationism of many American churches, of individual Christians and of the Socialist Party, and have been in favor of resolutely shouldering the responsibilities for the preservation of the democracies by active resistance to the evil of Hitlerism. However, they took this stand only while adding three

most important qualifications which are today as relevant as ever.²²

First, it should be clear that such a decision should be reached with the greatest sorrow and with a deep realization of the tragic necessities of human history. There never was, and there certainly is not now a defensible case for a *holy* war. The churches are right if they want to prevent a repetition of what happened in all countries in the last war. It should also be clear that once heretical absolutistic, perfectionist arguments are discarded, the discussion has to run in terms of the most probable consequences and the probably most effective means to ends that have been agreed on. In such a discussion, nobody can have the whole truth, and even if one position is more correct, the other one almost always tends to take care of some point neglected by the first. It was and remains, therefore, the duty of the churches to make the discussion of alternative policies as objective and generous as possible. In particular, they ought to use their influence to protect those minorities which do not clearly misuse democratic rights, against popular persecution and coercion. This applies to national and "racial" minorities as well as to conscientious objectors.

Secondly, it could be very realistically argued that the alternative "war *or* social reform" is incorrect and misleading. Though one should not be too sanguine about what can be done in a short time, one might rather assert that active defense of democracies against Germany and active social reform belong closely together. Without a defeat of Hitler, social reform will become impossible, and on the other hand, without social-democratic reforms that develop essential liberties and economic effectiveness, it might be very difficult to beat the German Empire. This last argument runs in three directions: To begin with, one has to reduce the power of those parts of the upper strata of society which tend to sympathize more or less with Hitler and which have actively or unknowingly contributed to sabotaging the economic defense effort, as for instance monopolies actually did in France and Britain and also, to some degree, in this country. Furthermore, if only in order to prevent demagogues from exploiting the more widespread discontents in favor of anti-democratic and pro-Hitlerian

²²It will be obvious from the context that these "qualifications" do not intend to give support to those groups that either intentionally or in effect teach that any religious interpretation of the war situation in terms reaching *beyond* the immediate war effort must make our participation in the war a half-hearted and wavering one. Just the opposite would be true.

purposes, it is important to bring about a juster distribution of the burdens of rearmament and defense. The very need for a sharp increase in income taxation as the primary means to avoid a major inflation makes it imperative to render our tax system as just as possible. But, in addition, many other social reforms are possible and desirable—barring, of course, those that would clearly strengthen inflationary and/or “syndicalist” tendencies. Finally, in order to win the support of the masses in the conquered countries, Germany of course included, the democracies must show, or at least seriously begin to show, that they want to do more than preserve the status quo, that they are heeding the warnings of the crisis of modern Western society and want to advance in the direction of a more stable, a more meaningful and juster society. Religious socialists are convinced that such reform is essential, and though they were and are aware of the dangers to the defense effort and to democracy which certain actions of the labor movements present, as well as of the serious shortcomings of all labor movements still in existence, they are nevertheless set against any development that would handicap democratic mass movements and institutions, since without these the achievement of significant social reforms is impossible.

The third and perhaps most important qualification stresses the point that, although the defeat of Hitler Germany is indispensable, it is only the first half of the task. We must also think—and think now!—about the peace afterwards. It is of little importance to make *exact* proposals about the peace treaties and about the required new international organizations. The significance of such proposals is chiefly to clarify the values and general objectives of people ahead of time, in other words to prepare the right attitude which alone will permit us to build a fairly stable social and international order. This then is, perhaps, one of the most important tasks of the churches: to develop an attitude which will prevent the mistakes of 1919. In any war, even if the churches do not contribute to it, there will be a strong tendency to become self-righteous and vindictive. The problem of a reorganization of Europe and of the political and economic world order is terribly complicated, but one thing is sure: a nationalistic, vindictive peace definitely would produce new chaos in perhaps less than twenty years, and would help to further the internal decline and the disintegration of the victorious democracies.²³ Therefore, more

than ever one must help people, young and old, to remain level-headed, to think clearly and critically and to preserve clear moral standards that are neither too low nor too "lofty." The same requirement holds true for the long work of social reconstruction which has to be begun at the latest after the immediate external danger has passed. For if the causes of fascism are to be found in the imperfections and self-destructive forces of democratic society itself, democracies cannot simply return to "life as usual." The necessary reconstruction will most certainly be endangered by vested interests, by vested symbols and by utopian hopes. Consequently, in addition to energy and spiritual preconditions, the degree of the sound rationality of both the leaders and the public is obviously of particularly great importance. In short, in the time ahead of us, Christian love would seem to be needed most of all in the preservation, development, and regeneration of our rational faculties.

Conclusion. We may conclude this characterization of "religious socialism" and of its attitude toward the present world crisis by one more simple consideration. We have tried to show on the one hand *that* Christian faith is relevant and *how* it is relevant. It is not only, within the limits of a historical situation, "applicable," but most certainly commands and encourages "religious realization." On the other hand, we have concluded that such a world crisis as we experience today in its most acute forms—all the disintegration and despair and meaninglessness out of which the idols of today are born—would have been impossible if there had been more effective faith and creative, comprehensive love. *The very fact of Hitler is not only a danger to, but a terrible accusation of, Christianity.*

A full realization of this existential meaning of the national-socialist revolt and the World War will, perhaps, help us to avoid certain dangerous attitudes toward the crisis. First of all, there

²³One other possibility is that a defeated Germany might, voluntarily or by conquest, become a part of the Soviet system. In such a case, a regeneration of Bolshevism from its tragic degeneration and in particular a transformation of communism towards a more liberal-democratic socialism would be most unlikely. The latter desirable development both in Russia and especially in Germany (not to speak of other European countries) is, however, within the range of possibilities, if Great Britain and the United States are able to achieve and to preserve an effective combination of both democratic economic and military strength and democratic social and international justice. For under those conditions, the democratic countries would most likely have a major material and moral share in the defeat of fascism and therefore also in the post-war reconstruction of Europe.

is little cause to use the crisis as an opportunity for preaching "the superiority of the Christian religion" as against other principles and beliefs. Of course, we believe that faith in God as revealed in and by Jesus Christ would give us both a new center of meaning beyond all possible human meanings, and the power of love to transform the world. However, the simple truth from which we have to start is that Christianity, thus far, has *not* proved superior in things that really matter. In the face of the great accusation which history, in the name of God, flings against the Christian religion in all its varieties, religious socialism included, and against all the more or less secularized offshoots of Christianity, humanism, liberalism, socialism and so on, our first and supreme task is most profound and humble "metanoia," a complete change of heart. If we really understand what this means, we will also be able to avoid the opposite danger, that is avoid deafening our ears to the calls of the present hour because of a sharper awareness of our sins and guilts. "Thou wilt remain forever dead, Unless thou blossom'st *now and here.*" Indeed, in the metanoia of faith, we might consider all the deep distress of our time which shakes our idols and necessitates our going back to the spiritual roots of our lives, as a glorious promise, a sign of grace. And, well remembering the danger of sinful pride in man's noblest beliefs and aspirations, we might one day be able to say with Milton:

"Behold now this vast City: a city of refuge, the mansion house of liberty, encompassed and surrounded with His protection; the shop of war hath not there more anvils and hammers waking, to fashion out the plates and instruments of armed Justice in defense of beleaguered Truth, than there be pens and heads there, sitting by their studious lamps, musing, searching, revolving new notions and ideas wherewith to present, as with their homage and their fealty, the approaching Reformation: others as fast reading, trying all things, assenting to the force of reason and conviction. What could a man require more from a Nation so pliant and so prone to seek after knowledge? What wants there to such a towardly and pregnant soil, but wise and faithful labourers, to make a knowing people, a Nation of Prophets, of Sages, and of Worthies? We reckon more than five months yet to harvest; there need not be five weeks; had we but eyes to lift up, the fields are white already."

Book Reviews

LIBERALISM AT ANDOVER

This is a timely and engaging book especially pertinent to the theological controversies so much in evidence since the first World War when resurgent Calvinistic theologies have endeavored to stem the rising tide of modern liberalism.¹ Andover Seminary was established in 1808 by Calvinists to combat Unitarianism, Universalism, and other tendencies of the times which were making inroads among the Calvinist Congregational churches of New England. Harvard went over to Unitarianism in 1805. But the strongest influences against the old doctrines were not primarily theological. They were political and social. Jeffersonian democracy placed a new emphasis upon the individual, upon his freedom and initiative. The idea that all men are created free and equal proclaimed release from the central Calvinistic doctrine of election. Arminianism was also against that doctrine and Arminianism was a prime factor in the rapidly spreading Methodist movement. The growth of towns and cities, destined to vastly increase as the industrial revolution grew, gave men a new sense of power and responsibility. Calvinistic theology sprang from the sixteenth century and it is evidence of its strength that it was able to carry on so successful an opposition to many powerful antagonists for three hundred years and more.

"The Andover Liberals" were members of the Andover Seminary faculty and others whose writings appeared in the *Andover Review* which was founded in 1884 and continued for a decade or so. These liberals were impelled by acquaintance with modern thought to oppose or modify important features of traditional orthodoxy. Mr. Williams has made a careful study of the writers for the *Andover Review* and has given a clear, forceful and readable account of the changes in their thinking and the significance of their thought in relation to Calvinism itself. He shows how they were influenced by the discoveries and the new insights of critical biblical study, of evolution, of physical science and invention, of missionary enterprises, and the humanitarian movements represented by social settlements and other agencies. It is as if in the pages of the *Review*, within the space of a few years, there were brought together all the factors of the drama of religious thought from the prescientific age in which Calvinism was formulated to its challenge by the profoundest movements of the new era of science and social change. The liberals were not trying to undermine the old faith but were sincerely endeavoring to include with it the progress of scholarship and practical religion which they also respected. The problems they struggled with were those familiar to all religious thinkers who honestly face the task of carrying Christianity forward in the modern world. In this book the reader may see each problem sharply set against the old background and modified by the changes out of which the problem arose.

¹THE ANDOVER LIBERALS: A Study in American Theology. By Daniel Day Williams. New York: King's Crown Press, 1941. 203 pp. \$2.00.

Biblical studies created the problem as to the nature of revelation and the kind of authority that could be attributed to the scriptures. Evolution raised questions about both man and God. If the human race developed by gradual natural processes, the old ideas of sin and grace must be transformed if not discarded. If man, with increasing command of his environment and himself, had something to do with shaping his own destiny then the familiar doctrine of predestination was shaken. Physical science made occasion for the question of the relation of the two worlds of matter and mind and made it harder to see how God as usually conceived could either perform the needed miracles to harmonize his world or achieve the harmony without miracles. Herbert Spencer's science and philosophy, so influential at the time, ended in complete agnosticism. The problem of slavery arose in a political and economic crisis which forced a recognition of the inadequacy of the old ideas of human nature. Missionary enterprises pressed the issue as to whether tribes without the Law could have responsibility through conscience, and whether it were not better never to preach the gospel to the heathen than to convict them of sin by enlightenment. Social settlements seemed to offer to the underprivileged opportunities for growth in character, but what validity and saving power could be afforded by mere ethical and cultural advancement?

The liberals were optimistic. Their optimism seemed to be justified by improvement in understanding and controlling nature and human nature in the interest of a better social order. Spencer spread optimism and even pointed toward utopian plenty and comfort and justice. But neither Spencer's philosophy nor his optimism carried beyond his own century. In spite of its immediate vogue it passed from the interest of scientists, philosophers, and religionists quickly with the opening of the twentieth century.

Mr. Williams concludes his fruitful study with recognition of the failure of the Andover Liberals to carry their liberalism through. He suggests the contrast between the seeming definiteness of the old faith in comparison with the tentativeness and vagueness of liberalism. He implies that the reconstruction of religious thought may yet follow the lines of more recent developments toward new ideas of Man, Nature, and God. War, economic depression, staggering social problems, may create nostalgia for the old familiar haunts of man's spiritual traditions, but the adventurous liberals of Andover may have undaunted successors who will refuse to be turned aside from their quest by the length of the trail or by the lions in the way. The last paragraph of the book is significant:

"The genuinely naturalistic element in the Andover theology was the conviction that man, released from authority and superstition can, with the tools of intelligence and good will, make a better life and better world for himself, and that in all increase of value he is cooperating with a super-human power which guides and sustains him. Only the experiment of attempting this task within the time and the conditions allotted to it can show whether this liberal faith is based on reality or illusion."

The Disciples Divinity House
The University of Chicago

EDWARD SCRIBNER AMES

TAKE CHRISTIANITY SERIOUSLY—OR ELSE!

The minister of The Universalist Church of Canton, N. Y., and associate editor of this JOURNAL, in his recent volume *Our Prodigal Son Culture* gave evidence of a soul bursting with a prophetic message for the liberal world. In his current volume¹ he continues his prophecy. The sub-title, "A Manifesto for Christian Brotherhood" is somewhat pretentious for the work is rather a serious message to literate Protestant laymen on the same theme as the previous volume, namely, the necessity for the recovery of the Judeo-Christian tradition as the sub-stratum for our Western Civilization.

Pleasant Valley, in "upstate" New York, with its boarded-up church edifice, is the background for the message. Mr. Tigner's thesis is that the ghost church is the symbol of the cultural decay of many neighborhoods.

The men who built the church in Pleasant Valley had a backbone, strengthened by the thoughts, the "memory verses," the prayers, and the forms of Christian Protestantism. Their sons, who have cut loose from the "bondage of tradition" typify the danger which "threatens to make our civilization into a mirror where the common man contemplates himself, and is pleased by the image of his mediocrity."

"Saving the Values of Democracy" (chapter IV) is actually an issue of religious faith. For "so long as American unity was rooted in the Judeo-Christian faith, based on the concept of the God-given moral law and symbolized by 'the village church whose spire pointed significantly heavenward,' there was a favorable soil and opportunity for the liberties necessary to democratic society" (chapter III).

Part of the difficulty has been that our "modern secularized school is philosophically unequipped and morally unprepared to perform the function it undertakes, namely to be the "principal treasury and dispenser of the knowledge, the virtues, the values necessary for the maintenance of our culture and its progress" (chapter V). Our colleges cannot educate because they are non-committal about what men value and believe.

Mr. Tigner is one of a growing number of chastened liberals who sees the doom of a "liberal" church whose attractiveness has been based upon a latitudinarianism mistakenly called broad-mindedness, a church that achieved a large part of its success by promising a minimum of demands upon its parishioners. His writings are an attempt to call liberal Protestantism back to the true path, to induce liberals to take Christianity seriously. Mr. Tigner points a stern accusing finger at the secularism which has in many instances taken control of the church.

His writings do not present a novel theme, nor are they based on original historical research. Nor do they purport to be as finished a philosophy of history as that of a Berdyaev or a Niebuhr. The value of both of Mr. Tigner's volumes lies in their "popularizing" (in the best sense of that word) the Christian interpretation of history, an interpretation which

¹NO SIGN SHALL BE GIVEN. By Hugh Stevenson Tigner. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942. 198 pp. \$1.75. For the full stern import of the title, see Matthew XVI, 1-4.

has a stirring ring of reality about it, and which is rapidly gaining credence in our day. Mr. Tigner's vivacious vocabulary makes *No Sign Shall Be Given* a volume which ministers may wholeheartedly recommend to thoughtful laymen who are attempting to keep up with movements in the Christian world. And ministers would do well to encourage the reading of such a work or they may find their sermons increasingly misunderstood by a congregation which has lagged too far behind in the understanding of current thought.

The Unitarian Church, Hinsdale, Illinois.

EDWARD W. OHRENSTEIN.

TRADE WINDS OF THE SPIRIT

The appearance of Volume I of this work¹ was an event in the world of inspirational literature, the advent of Volume II is eloquent testimony of a deep and abiding yearning in men's souls "to feel after God if happily they might find him." It is one thing to assume that man ought to want this touchstone of the spirit; but it is something altogether different when that haunting suspicion becomes a demand for more, and yet ever more!

Perhaps these twin volumes are as close as we liberals shall ever come to a Book of Common Prayer; to a liturgy of the Free Spirit, to a rosary of thoughts strung on the golden thread of aspiration. If so it be, it is well! For in them there breathes the Spirit Universal which is in all things and through all things, whispering wistfully in a poet's plaintive cry, and then rising sonorously into the scientist's positive declaration of a Cosmic Ought and Must. Here is food for every temper and temperament; for every mood and movement; for those who live by the heart and those who live by the head. It is the partisan of no specific school, yet it is the champion of all schools. It is the dogmatic of no particular system, still it is the authority back of all systems.

Faithfully does it address itself to the three great realities—The World, the Individual, and Society—The Blessed Trinity! In each of these three worlds it seeks to make man aware of those forces that companion him in his quest for the livableness of life. In one is the search for truth, in another self discipline, and in yet another the togetherness of the individual with his fellow-questers. Only a book with such audacious intent which sees the whole in every part would dare to insist that such as these are authentic voices: Pascal and Haydon, Epictetus and Havelock Ellis, Martineau and Sellars, Eusebius and Julian Huxley! Here is a catholicity which adjures that "mankind are one in spirit, and that an instinct bear along."

Though the selections are brief, numbering 447, yet they are not to be confused with the popular "one-a-day" brand to be taken before breakfast! Still there is no reason why as liberals we cannot make it a habit to read and then reflect upon one each day. Such a discipline would go

¹GREAT COMPANIONS. Vol. II. Compiled by Robert French Leavens and Mary Agnes Leavens. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1942, 684 pp. \$3.00.

far to giving a tone to the mind and a lilt to the spirit.

Let us fervently hope that ere the shadows lengthen and the sun sinks, the Leavens will honor us with a third Companion, thus giving us a trilogy of Angels on the Way! If so it be, our debt to them will be matched only by the greatness of their bequest!

The First Unitarian Church of Baltimore.

W. WALDEMAR W. ARGOW.

CONTINUING SYMBOLS OF THREE BELIEFS¹

This delightful little book is the most read of any religious book in the library of this resort village. The author writes sympathetically of Catholicism, Fundamentalism, and Liberalism. It is not within the scope of the work to offer a formal criticism of these; but the clarity of presentation is such that as philosophic systems the vulnerable points of each are clear. One might wish the author had added a chapter on modern Protestant beliefs instead of leaving the reader with the liberal romanticism of prewar days.

HAROLD SCOTT.

Newport, Vermont

¹THREE TYPICAL BELIEFS. By Theodore Gerald Soares. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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